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ABSTRACT 
We attempt to investigate IPO underpricing and stabilization activities. We find IPO 
underpricing of around 25% in the Indonesia market. Return distribution for the first 30-trading 
days shows a positive skew, the distribution becomes closer to normality as the period 
lengthens. We then develop and test five algorithms to detect IPO intervention. An important 
goal of this paper is to develop an algorithm that will be able to detect IPO intervention using 
public data. We find that the number of closing prices that are equal to the offer prices and the 
skewness of the IPO return in the first 30-trading days are the ‘best’ stabilization measures. 
Having found “the best measures”, then we investigate under what conditions IPO intervention 
is more intensive. We find that underwriters tend to stabilize more on more expensive IPOs.  
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INTRODUCTION 
IPO1 underpricing is a common phenomenon 
found in practically all the capital markets 
around the world. For example, in the Indone-
sian market, Utamaningsih (2013) found that 
IPO underpricing, calculated by the difference 
between the closing price on the first trading 
day, to the original offer price on the Indonesian 
Stock Exchange, averages around 30%. 
Underpricing is considered as an implicit cost to 
the company issuing its shares to the public, in 
addition to being an explicit cost, such as the 
cost of underwriting. A company, issuing shares 
to the public loses an opportunity to obtain a 
larger amount of funds collected from the IPO 
sales. 
Various theories have been advanced to ex-
plain the IPO underpricing. Baron (1982) devel-
oped a model based on asymmetric information 
between a company and its underwriter. The 
underwriter possesses better information than the 
company. The underwriter prefers to have a 
                                                            
*  We thank anonymous referees for their comments and 
suggestions. We also thank participants of 2014 Faculty 
of Economics and Business seminar for Case and 
Research Results Dissemination. 
lower offer price so as to be able to sell the 
shares more easily to public investors. Hence, 
the underwriter will prefer to set a lower offer 
price; which tends to increase underpricing. 
Using an asymmetry framework, other research-
ers argue that the IPO is a signal to the market. 
Good companies offer higher underpricing to 
investors to signal their quality. This signal is 
costly; it is difficult for poor companies to im-
itate. Thus the signal is credible. The company 
can benefit from the signal, for example, the 
company can be expected to receive a more 
favorable price when it issues seasoned equity 
offers.  
Rock (1986) developed a winner’s curse 
model to explain IPO underpricing. In his model, 
there are 2 types of investors: informed and 
uninformed investors. Informed investors will 
buy good IPOs and do not buy bad ones. Unin-
formed investors do not have good information 
about which IPO is good or bad. Uninformed 
investors buy both good and bad IPOs. As a 
result, informed investors will always gain at the 
expense of the uninformed investors. In an equi-
librium setting, uninformed investors will even-
tually withdraw from the IPO market, leading to 
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the collapse of that market. To keep uninformed 
investors participating in the IPO market, unin-
formed investors must be compensated. IPO 
underpricing is a form of compensation for unin-
formed investors to keep them in the IPO 
market.  
Deliberate IPO underpricing is difficult to re-
concile with reasonable logic and empirical evi-
dence. Why is a company willing to give up 
about 30% of the ‘money on the table’? This 
number is significant. The logic of Rock’s 
(1986) model is also questioned, since empirical 
vidence shows that IPOs are generally oversub-
scribed. Why does the company need to provide 
compensation when there are so many potential 
buyers for its IPO? In general, models based on 
information asymmetry seem to receive little 
support. 
Ritter (2002) argued that the most potential 
explanation for the IPO phenomenon may come 
from the agency theory and behavioral finance. 
The agency theory for IPOs explores several 
issues, such as how the IPO is allocated between 
institutional and individual investors (Aggarwal 
et al., 2002), stabilization activities in the IPO 
market (Aggarwal et al., 2002; Ruud, 1993), the 
effect of ownership structure on IPO perfor-
mance (Brennan and Franks, 1997), and flipping 
activities on the first trading day of IPOs 
(Aggarwal, 2000; Wilhelm, 1999). Behavioral 
finance for IPOs discusses issues such as the 
prospect theory (Kahneman dan Tversky, 1979) 
for IPOs and market sentiment related to the IPO 
market (Cornell et al, 2006).  
This research attempts to extend the litera-
ture on IPOs by investigating price stabilization 
on Indonesian IPOs. Price stabilization is an 
action to prevent or decrease the price fall for 
IPO stocks (Aggarwal, 2002). The action covers 
various mechanisms, such as share purchasing 
by the underwriter in secondary markets, discou-
raging flipping activities in IPO’s market, IPO 
allocation (the underwriter allocates the IPO to 
investors who will not flip the IPO stocks), and 
other mechanisms as well. Although price 
stabilization is a promising explanation for the 
phenomenon of IPO underpricing, empirical 
research on this issue is relatively less known. 
This paper attempts to fill this void. We also 
investigate various algorithms to detect price 
stabilization in IPO markets using public data. 
We consider 5 alternative algorithms: (1) the 
number of closing prices in the first 30 trading 
days that are equal to or higher than the offer 
prices, (2) the number of closing prices in the 
first 30 trading days that are equal to the offer 
price, (3) the ratio of return distribution for the 
first 30 trading days to that for the first 60-90 
trading days, (4) the skewness of the first 30 
trading day return, and (5) the number of closing 
prices, in the first 30 trading days, that are above 
the offer prices and preceded by closing prices 
below the offer price on the previous day.1 
We find that the return distribution for the 
first 30 trading days for IPOs on the Indonesian 
Stock Exchange is positively skewed, suggesting 
that there is price stabilization. This result is 
consistent with that of Ruud (1993). Then we 
compare the 5 price stabilization algorithms to 
determine which 1 is the best indicator to predict 
price stabilization. A natural approach is to com-
pare price stabilization to the degree of IPO 
underpricing. Thus we regress various price 
stabilization algorithms on IPO underpricing. 
Our result show that the algorithms that uses the 
number of closing prices in the first 30 trading 
days that are equal to the offer price, and the 
degree of skewness of the IPO return in the first 
30 trading days, predict IPO underpricing well. 
In the last part, we show that stabilization activi-
ties exist more in shares with a higher ratio of 
price to book value.  
We organized our paper as follows. In the 
next section, we present the literature review, 
followed by the empirical results. The last sec-
tion offers our conclusions. 
Literature Review 
IPO stabilization can be defined as the 
actions to prevent the IPO price from falling 
below its offer price. These actions can be done 
either with pre and/or aftermarket IPOs. Various 
premarket actions can be done, such as 
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this paper.  
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determining IPO allocations (allocate it to inves-
tors who will not flip the IPO), and discouraging 
flipping activities. Aftermarket actions are done 
after IPO trades in the secondary market. After-
market actions in many situations are closely 
related to premarket actions. Aggarwal (2002) 
showed 3 aftermarket stabilization actions: (1) 
‘pure’ stabilization, in which the underwriters 
post bid prices not exceeding offer prices, (2) 
short covering from a short position taken before 
the IPO trades in the aftermarket. Underwriters 
initially sell shares in excess of the original IPO 
amount offered, effectively taking a short posi-
tion. Then this short position will be covered 
either by exercising the overallotment option 
and/or short covering in the aftermarket, (3) 
underwriters penalize investors who flip the IPO 
quickly, referred to as a penalty bid. Short cover-
ing has an advantage compared to pure stabiliza-
tion, since underwriters do not have to disclose 
this plan. Aggarwal (2002) showed that pure 
stabilization is actually relatively minor com-
pared to the other means.  
The literature offers several explanations on 
why underwriters provide IPO price support 
(Lewellen, 2006): Price support as a reward to 
investors and as a bonding mechanism, price 
support as a form of price manipulation, and 
price support to maintain the underwriter’s 
reputation. In the first explanation, underwriters 
provide compensation to investors, more specifi-
cally uninformed investors. Chowdhry & Nanda 
(1996) based on Rock’s (1986) model, argue that 
stabilization is an alternative to compensation to 
uninformed investors in the winner’s curse set-
ting for the IPO. A commitment to buy an IPO at 
the offer price is effectively equal to giving a 
‘put’ option to investors, which is an additional 
value to investors who buy the IPO, especially 
uninformed investors. Uninformed investors, in 
Rock’s model (1986) are parties who will likely 
end up buying poor IPOs. Chowdhry & Nanda 
(1996) argue that stabilization may be more effi-
cient than underpricing in compensating unin-
formed investors for the problem of adverse 
selection costs.  
In the second explanation, underwriters 
stabilize IPO markets to manipulate prices. 
Hanley et al. (1993) argued that stabilization 
activities may increase stock prices and disguise 
poor IPOs. However, this argument may be 
questionable since it is hard to deceive rational 
investors. One may argue that while stabilization 
may not deceive informed investors, but it could 
well deceive uninformed investors. Schultz & 
Zaman (1994) argued that stabilization can be 
expected to increase the aftermarket price. This 
can be done by reducing the supply of IPO 
shares. Price support at the offer price can be 
expected to reduce cascading from price decline, 
since the underwriter promises to buy the IPO at 
offer price. 
In the third explanation, the underwriter 
attempts to maintain his/her reputation. An over-
priced IPO may signal the underwriters’ incom-
petency, lack of effort, and honesty. The incident 
of IPO overpricing may affect the underwriters’ 
future revenue, and may have adverse impacts 
on the underwriter. Beatty & Ritter (1986) and 
Dunbar (2000) showed that an underwriter that 
prices IPOs inaccurately loses market share, and 
experiences a decline in the underwriters’ market 
value in the subsequent period. Larger underwri-
ters may stabilize to a greater extent than smaller 
ones since their stake is larger, and also the abil-
ity to stabilize at greater extent is stronger for 
larger underwriters than for smaller ones. 
Stabilization activities are difficult to meas-
ure, and even to detect. Lack of data and transpa-
rency from the industry are probably the main 
causes of this difficulty. Using proprietary data, 
Lewellen (2006) developed 3 measures of stabi-
lization activities. First, Lewellen (2006) identi-
fied unusually high selling volumes from inves-
tors to underwriting syndicates and then calcu-
lated changes in the market maker’s inventory 
position after the offer. The idea is that any 
attempt to stabilize the market (purchase shares) 
will inflate the share price to an artificially 
higher level. Rational investors recognize this 
situation, and start taking advantage by selling 
shares at higher than normal prices. This action 
leads to a decrease in the market maker’s inven-
tory position. This change in the market maker’s 
inventory position are used as a proxy for stabi-
lization activities. 
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Second, a stickiness in the stock price during 
a stabilization period may indicate stabilization 
activities. Underwriters attempt to prevent the 
price declining to below the offer price. They 
will allow the price to decline only after efforts 
to maintain prices fail. This action creates a 
stickiness in a stock price during stabilization 
periods. Third, Lewellen (2006), in a similar 
spirit to Ruud (1993) and Prabhala & Puri 
(1999), used a dummy with the value of 1 for 
IPOs that close at offer price on the first trading 
day (stabilized) and 0 for IPOs that close below 
offer price (not stabilized). Ruud (1993) and 
Prabhala & Puri (1999) found that the return dis-
tribution for IPO was almost censored at 0. The 
return distribution for IPO returns is heavily 
skewed to the right (positive skewed). This me-
thod assumes that no stabilization activities 
occurred for the IPOs that closed below or even 
above the offer price.  
Lewellen (2006) showed that stabilization 
activities are more complex than those that can 
be described in the third measure. However, the 
third measure has the advantage of its novelty. 
This paper takes that spirit of novelty to measure 
stabilization activities. Specifically, we attempt 
to measure stabilization activities using pub-
lished data, which are the daily closing prices. 
Once we are able to develop such a measure, we 
will be able to detect and measure stabilization 
activities using a simple, yet powerful technique.  
In the Indonesian market, stabilization by 
underwriters is allowed by the Bapepam (Badan 
Pengawas Pasar Modal or Indonesia Capital 
Market Supervisory Agency). Practically, in 
many countries, IPO stabilization is probably the 
only non-natural capital market transaction that 
is allowed. Stabilization activities are regulated 
by a Capital Market decree, (Number 88/PM/ 
1996), which was then replaced by a revised 
decree in 2009. The regulation basically allows 
market stabilization for the first 30 trading days 
of the IPO. Underwriters have to state any 
stabilization plans in the prospectus. The IPO 
intervention prices have to be at the offer price. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
1.  Sample and Data 
We used IPOs in the Indonesian market from 
1995 to 2012. 1995 was the start of the JATS 
(Jakarta Automated Trading System), where all 
transactions are recorded electronically. We do 
not use IPOs from before 1995, since this older 
IPO data are more difficult to verify their vali-
dity. We collected 231 IPOs for our sample. For 
regression analysis in the section of the deter-
minants of stabilization activities, we used only 
samples with complete data. For this section, we 
were able to collect around 140 IPOs for our 
sample. We collected the first day closing price 
of IPOs, the offer price, the size of the IPO (both 
in Rupiah and in shares), the percentage of the 
IPO relative to the total outstanding shares, the 
ratio of Price to Book Value, and the daily 
closing price for up to 120 trading days in the 
IPO aftermarket. The data are collected from the 
Indonesian Stock Exchange and IPO prospec-
tuses. 
2.  Underpricing and Return Distribution 
Table 1 reports the underpricing (initial 
return) and aftermarket return for our sample. 
Aftermarket returns consist of 5, 30, 60, and 90 
day returns. The table shows that the mean of 
underpricing (initial return) in the Indonesian 
market is around 23%. This number is lower 
than the number reported by Utamaningsih 
(2013). The median for the initial return is lower 
than the mean, suggesting that the distribution of 
the initial return is not normal. The distribution 
seems to have a positive skew. Normal distri-
bution would show little difference between the 
mean and the median. 
5 day aftermarket returns shows similar 
characteristics to the initial returns. The median 
is lower than the mean, suggesting a positive 
skew. The maximum return is around 187%, 
while the minimum is around 47%, suggesting 
overpricing of this IPO. 30, 60 and 90 day 
aftermarket returns show a trend toward normal 
distribution. The averages tend to move lower as 
the number of days grows larger. The average 
for 90 day aftermarket returns is around 18%, 
which is much lower than the initial returns. The 
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differences between the mean and median of 
aftermarket returns tends to grow smaller as the 
aftermarket lengthens, suggesting that return 
distribution conforms more closely to normal 
distribution as the time period grows.  
Lower returns in the 90 day aftermarket 
suggest price reversal of the IPO. Initial returns 
show larger returns and reverses in the after-
market. Interestingly, returns in the aftermarket 
period decrease gradually as the length of after-
market period increases. This pattern seems to 
be consistent with the tendency to move towards 
a normal distribution as the length of aftermarket 
period increases. 
Table 2 shows the initial return distribution 
based on the year of the IPO. Interestingly we 
find that the initial return is very volatile. Initial 
returns have negative values in 1995 and 2011. 
In 2001 and 2010, means of the initial return 
have the largest value. Table 3 shows the initial 
return distribution based on the type of industry. 
Our definition of industry follows that of the 
Indonesian Stock Exchange. Again, the amount 
of the initial return varies among the industries. 
Real Estate and Basic Chemicals record the 
largest IPO initial return. The initial return does 
not seem to be homogenous across the various 
industries and years. Ritter & Welch (2002), 
using US data, found that the initial return varies 
across the years. There were fewer IPOs in the 
US from 1935 to 1959 than in 1969 alone. La 
Porta et al. (1997) reported wide differences in 
IPO activities across countries. This pattern 
leaves questions on why in certain years there 
are more IPOs and higher initial returns than in 
other years, why initial returns are higher in 
some industries than in other industries, and why 
there are more IPOs in some countries than in 
other countries. 
3. Return Distribution of IPO returns 
Stabilization activities are difficult to mea-
sure directly. Limited data and the lack of 
transparency from the underwriter prevented us 
from measuring stabilization directly. This paper 
attempts to measure intervention activities indi-
rectly, using published data. Specifically, we 
attempt to investigate patterns of IPO returns 
surrounding the IPO period. Bapepam (Supervi-
sory Agency for Indonesia Stock Market) allows 
intervention by the underwriter for the first 30 
days of IPO trading activities in the secondary 
market. We believe that such activities will be 
reflected in the return pattern of the IPO, such as 
the distribution of the IPO return (Ruud, 1993). 
For example, if intervention activities do affect 
the return distribution, then we can expect that 
return distribution to differ in the days beyond 
30, (for example in the first 60 to 90 trading days 
in the secondary market) from that in the first 30 
days in the secondary market. That first 30 
trading day period is when intervention is 
allowed. We can expect that the return distri-
bution in the first 30 trading days will depart 
from non-normality distribution (a more positive 
skewness), while return distribution in days 60 
to 90, which is a ‘normal’ period, will conform 
more closely to the normal distribution. The 
ratio of the degree of skewness in the normal to 
Table 1. IPO Initial Return and Aftermarket Return in the Indonesian Stock Exchange 
Initial return is calculated as ln (price at period t/offer price). 5-day return is calculated as ln (price at day 5 
relative to first trading day/offer price). Similar calculation is done for 30, 60, and 90 day return. The sample 
consists of IPOs from year 1995 to 2012 in the Indonesian Stock Exchange. 
 Initial Return 5-dayreturn 30-day return 60-day return 90-day return 
Mean 0.2306 0.2714 0.2562 0.2150 0.1795 
Median 0.1542 0.1445 0.1432 0.1178 0.1398 
Standard Deviation 0.3105 0.3909 0.4828 0.5757 0.6277 
Minimum -0.7178 -0.4745 -0.8824 -1.1982 -1.7987 
Maximum 1.7579 1.8718 2.1401 2.0794 2.0149 
Number of Observation 231 232 232 231 231 
Source: Center for Business and Economic Data, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Gadjah Mada  
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non-normal period may measure the degree of 
IPO intervention in the secondary market. 
Table 4 shows the distribution of IPO returns 
for the initial return and the aftermarket returns 
in the secondary market. We report 5, 30, 60, 
and 90 day aftermarket returns. 
The table seems to confirm our prediction. 
Initial returns show a positive skewness distri-
bution. The values of the skewness for returns up 
to 30 days are positive. As IPO intervention 
diminishes 2 , the skewness becomes closer to 
zero, suggesting that return distribution moves 
closer to normal distribution. The value of the 
skewness for normal distribution is zero. 
Kurtosis tends to decrease as the length of the 
period increases. While the value of kurtosis for 
normal distribution is 3, the decrease in kurtosis 
                                                            
2  We use the first 30 trading days as a period of IPO 
intervention. Bapepam regulation states that the under-
writer may intervene in IPO trading during the first 30 
trading days. 
Table 2. Initial Return Distribution Based on the IPO’s Year 
This table presents initial return based on the year of the IPO. Initial return is calculated as ln (price at period 
t/offer price). The sample consists of IPOs from 1995 to 2012 in the Indonesian Stock Exchange. 
Year Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Number of 
Observation 
1995 -0.0009 0.0043 0.1513 -0.2963 0.3646 14 
1996 0.1047 0.0732 0.1185 -0.0870 0.3857 16 
1997 0.0807 0.1301 0.2123 -0.7178 0.4055 30 
1998 0.1069 0.0877 0.3345 -0.2513 0.7138 6 
1999 0.2745 0.1610 0.2568 0.0000 0.7885 8 
2000 0.3823 0.2451 0.3341 -0.0513 1.0647 21 
2001 0.5011 0.3765 0.4970 -0.3567 1.7579 31 
2002 0.2452 0.2546 0.2749 -0.3939 0.5306 22 
2003 0.0637 0.0353 0.1149 -0.0645 0.2683 6 
2004 0.1549 0.0912 0.1632 0.0000 0.5188 12 
2005 0.1245 0.0852 0.1457 -0.0526 0.3895 8 
2006 0.3016 0.2965 0.1830 0.0377 0.5831 12 
2007 0.2310 0.1782 0.2308 -0.1376 0.5306 25 
2008 0.2187 0.2007 0.2200 -0.1863 0.5306 19 
2010 0.5278 0.5278 . 0.5278 0.5278 1 
2011 -0.0101 -0.0101 . -0.0101 -0.0101 1 
Source: Center for Business and Economic Data, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Gadjah Mada 
Table 3. Initial Return Distribution Based on the type of Industry 
This table presents initial return based on the year of the IPO. Initial return is calculated as ln (price at period 
t/offer price). The sample consists of IPOs from 1995 to 2012 in the Indonesian Stock Exchange. Industry 
categories follow the Indonesian Stock Exchange definition. 
Industry Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Number of 
Observation 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 0.2427 0.1431 0.3306 -0.3075 0.7178 13 
Consumer Goods 0.0831 0.0660 0.2239 -0.2963 0.6444 11 
Basic Chemicals 0.3018 0.1884 0.3236 -0.0870 0.9651 20 
Infrastructure, Utility, and Transportation 0.0287 0.0241 0.0312 0.0000 0.0619 3 
Financials 0.1688 0.1398 0.3056 -0.7178 1.0116 39 
Trades and Services 0.2955 0.1823 0.4461 -0.3567 1.7579 31 
Mining 0.1389 0.0426 0.2688 0.0000 0.7397 7 
Agriculture 0.3155 0.1823 0.3350 0.0000 1.0598 9 
Real Estate 0.4087 0.2231 0.4315 -0.1252 1.3106 15 
Others 0.2060 0.1695 0.2057 -0.1863 0.5831 84 
Source: Center for Business and Economic Data, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Gadjah Mada 
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for the aftermarket returns suggests that return 
distribution widens. The highest value for kurto-
sis for the initial return seems to suggest that 
initial returns peak at a certain value, which we 
believe is zero return (closing price is equal to 
offer price). This pattern seems to support the 
stabilization hypothesis for the IPO market.  
4.  Measures of Stabilization Activities 
As explained in the previous section, we 
attempted to measure the degree of stabilization 
in the IPO market. We showed that the return 
distribution for IPO markets in the first 30 
trading days does not conform to normal distri-
bution. In this section, we attempt to develop 
further measures for IPO stabilization. We 
develop 5 algorithms to measure the degree of 
stabilization. First, during the first 30 trading 
days, we count the number of closing prices that 
are equal to the offer price. Bapepam regulations 
state that the underwriter is allowed to support 
the IPO stock at its offer price. In other words, 
the underwriter could bid the IPO stock at a 
maximum of its offer price. Thus, this regulation 
provides us with a first and simple clue to 
measure the degree of stabilization.  
If an IPO stock closes below its offer price, 
then we believe that the underwriter has not 
intervened with the IPO stock. If the closing 
price is above the offer price, then this method 
argues that the underwriter also does not inter-
vene with the stock. Intervention or stabilization 
only exists if the closing prices are equal to the 
offer prices. In this situation, the underwriter has 
attempted to support the IPO stock, to prevent 
the price from going below its offer price. 
In the second algorithm, during the first 30 
trading days, we calculate the number of closing 
prices that are the same or higher than the offer 
price. During the first 30 days, attempts by the 
underwriter to support the IPO price will result 
in prices either being the same or higher than the 
offer price. Closing prices do not have to be the 
same as the offer price for stabilization condi-
tions.  
In the third algorithm, we develop the 
following method. If the closing price of the IPO 
stock at day t is above the offer price, and the 
closing price at day t-1 is below the offer price, 
then that indicates there have been stabilization 
activities. The underwriter attempts to maintain 
his/her reputation, so the underwriter will 
attempt to support the IPO price to stop it from 
falling below its offer price. With this method, 
we argue that stabilization activities start the 
next day. Thus the situation in which the closing 
price is below the offer price becomes a trigger 
for the stabilization activities. 
The fourth algorithm uses the skewness 
measure for the return distribution of the first 30 
trading days. As explained in the previous sec-
tion, skewness may indicate support to maintain 
the price of the IPO stock. Our fifth algorithm 
uses the ratio of skewness in the first 30 trading 
days to the skewness in days 60 to 90 relative to 
the initial trading. In the previous section, we 
showed that return distribution for the first 30 
trading days departs significantly from normal 
distribution, while the return distribution for 
days after 30 relative to the initial trading 
conforms more closely to normal distribution. 
The degree of non-normality in the first 30 
Table 4. Kurtosis, Range, and Skewness of the IPO Return 
Initial return is calculated as ln (price at period t/offer price). 5-day return is calculated as ln (price at day 5 
relative to first trading day/offer price). Similar calculations are done for the 30, 60, and 90 day returns. The 
sample consists of IPOs from 1995 to 2012 in the Indonesian Stock Exchange. Kurtosis, range, and skewness, 
are calculated cross-sectionally for our sample IPOs. 
 Initial Return 5-day return 30-day return 60-day return 90-day return 
Kurtosis 3.1073 1.5883 1.2620 0.6932 0.5000 
Range 2.4757 2.3463 3.0225 3.2777 3.8136 
Skewness 1.1737 1.2169 0.9484 0.6922 0.2592 
Source:  Center for Business and Economic Data, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Gadjah Mada 
and Authors’ calculation 
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trading days will be captured by the ratio of 
skewness in the first 30 trading days to the 
skewness in days 60 to 90. We expect that this 
ratio will be able to measure the degree of IPO 
stabilization in the first 30 trading days. 
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics for the 5 
algorithms to detect IPO stabilization. 
For our sample, the mean of daily closing 
prices during the first 30 days that were equal to 
the offer price was 1.94 days. During the first 30 
trading days, most of the IPOs in our sample had 
closing prices that were higher than their offer 
prices. The mean for the second measure of 
stabilization is 21.59 days, while the median is 
29 days. The incident of positive returns at day t 
is higher than the offer price following negative 
return at day t-1, the third measure of stabiliza-
tion, is not common. The average for this mea-
sure is only 0.30. The maximum for this measure 
is 4. The fourth stabilization measure uses the 
skewness of the return distribution for the first 
30 trading days. The average of this skewness is 
positive which is consistent with our findings in 
the previous section. The number in this table is 
different from that in table 2, since the methodo-
logy in this table is different. The last measure 
shows a negative number of -1.31. We note 
extreme values for this measure, from -166.17 
for the minimum to 45.55 for the positive num-
ber. 
5.  In Search of a Good Stabilization Measure 
One of our goals in this paper was to formu-
late an algorithm to detect stabilization activities 
using public data. We already proposed 5 algo-
rithms to detect stabilization activities. In this 
section, we attempt to validate the 5 algorithms 
we developed in the previous section. Stabili-
zation activities are difficult to observe directly, 
hence we attempt to validate the measures indi-
rectly. Specifically, we will correlate the mea-
sures with other variable(s) that are expected to 
measure stabilization activities. We chose IPO 
underpricing as the candidate. The literature 
shows that underpricing and stabilization activi-
ties are closely related (Ruud, 1993; Lewellen, 
2006). The objective of stabilization is to 
prevent the IPO prices from falling below the 
offer price, hence to create a positive initial 
return (or IPO underpricing). Thus, intuitively 
we expect a positive relationship between our 
measures and underpricing, should the measures 
be valid.  
Table 6 reports the regression results of 
various stabilization measures on IPO under-
pricing. 
 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics For Stabilization Measures 
This table reports descriptive statistics for stabilization measures. In Stab1, we use the number of closing prices 
from day1 to 30 that are equal to or higher than the offer price. In Stab2, we calculate the number of closing 
prices that are equal to the offer price. In Stab3, we count the number of the following incidents: closing price at 
day t is above the offer price, preceded by closing price at day t-1 being below the offer price. In Stab4, we use 
skewness of the IPO return during the first 30 trading days (day1 to 30). In Stab5, we use a ratio of the skewness 
of the IPO return during the first 30 trading days to that in trading days 60-90. Return is calculated as ln (closing 
price at day t / offer price). Independent variable is initial return, calculated as ln (closing price at first trading 
day/offer price). 
 Stab1 Stab2 Stab3 Stab4 Stab5 
Mean 1.94 21.59 0.30 0.019 -1.31 
Median 0 29 0 0.041 -0.047 
Standard deviation 5.64 11.53 0.67 1.058 15.38 
Minimum 0 0 0 -5.420 -166.17 
Maximum 29 29 4 2.711 45.55 
Number of observation 247 247 247 225 222 
Source:  Center for Business and Economic Data, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Gadjah Mada 
and Authors’ calculation 
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Tabel 6. The Effect of Stabilization on IPO Underpricing 
This table reports Ordinary Least Square regression results of various stabilization measures on IPO under-
pricing. We use the following algorithms to measure stabilization activities. In column (1), we use the number of 
closing prices from day1 to 30 that are equal to or higher than the offer price. In column (2), we calculate the 
number of closing prices that are equal to the offer price. In column (3), we count the number of the following 
incidents: the closing price at day t is above the offer price, preceded by the closing price at day t-1 being below 
the offer price. In column (4), we use the skewness of the IPO return during the first 30 trading days (day1 to 
30). In column (5), we use a ratio of the skewness of the IPO return during the first 30 trading days to that in 
trading days 60-90. Return is calculated as ln (closing price at day t/offer price). Dependent variable is initial 
return, calculated as ln (closing price at first trading day/offer price).***,**, and * denote significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.2455*** 
(<0.0001) 
-0,0773 
(0.1389) 
0.2480*** 
(<0,0001) 
0.2278*** 
(<0,001) 
0.2293*** 
(<0,0001) 
Stabilization 
Measure 
-0.0119*** 
(0.0031) 
0,0130*** 
(<0.001) 
-0,0842** 
(0,0140) 
0,0256 
(0,2648) 
-0.0008 
(0.5814) 
Adj R-square 
F value 
(prob) 
N 
0.00332 
8.92*** 
(0.0031) 
231 
0,1436 
39.73*** 
(<0.001) 
231 
0,0217 
6.13** 
(0,014) 
231 
0,0011 
1.25 
(0.2648) 
223 
-0.0032 
0.30 
(0.5814) 
220 
Source: Center for Business and Economic Data, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Gadjah Mada 
and Authors’ calculation 
 
The table shows that the second and fourth 
measures have positive regression coefficients as 
expected. The other measures have negative 
regression coefficients. However further inspec-
tion shows that only the second measure, which 
is the total number of days in the first 30 trading 
days in which closing prices are equal to the 
offer price, shows a positive and significant 
regression coefficient. The other measures show 
either negative significant regression coefficients 
or insignificant positive ones. We conclude that 
the total number of closing prices that are equal 
to the offer price is the best measure of IPO 
stabilization activities. 
6.  Determinants of Stabilization Activities 
Having established the “valid” stabilization 
measure, in this section we want to investigate in 
which conditions the underwriter intervenes in 
the IPO market more intensely. In other words, 
we want to investigate variables that affect an 
IPO’s stabilization. We consider 5 variables in 
this section: the total number of IPO shares, the 
IPO’s offer price, the total value of the IPO in 
Rupiah, the percentage of the IPO relative to the 
total outstanding shares, and the underwriters’ 
reputation. Table 7 shows descriptive statistics 
for the variables of interest in this section. 
The average offer price is 750 Rupiah, which 
is around 7.5 US cents ($0.075). This amount is 
definitely considered a penny stock by US 
standards. The percentage of the IPO is around 
25%, which is similar to 30% of the average 
shares sold to the public in Indonesia. The size 
of the shares underwriting is calculated for each 
underwriter during the period of this study. The 
amount is probably not a perfect measure since 
the amount for this variable covers various 
years, and we do not deflate the amount for this 
variable. This limitation also holds for other 
variables, such as the IPO size in Rupiah. 
We attempt to investigate the variables that 
affect stabilization activities using a regression 
technique. We consider 3 variables: the informa-
tion asymmetry variables, the pricing variables, 
and the underwriters’ reputation. Benveniste et 
al. (1996) and Chowdhry & Nanda (1996) used 
an information asymmetry framework in their 
IPO underpricing model. Chowdhry & Nanda 
(1996) showed that underpricing is needed to 
compensate uninformed investors in the 
winner’s curse setting of Rock’s (1986) model. 
Benveniste et al. (1996) modelled information 
asymmetry between underwriters and investors. 
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A commitment to stabilize the IPO at the offer 
price is needed to prevent investors’ losses from 
overpriced IPOs. The larger the information 
asymmetry, the larger the need for stabilization; 
hence we expect a positive relationship between 
information asymmetry and stabilization activi-
ties (Lewellen, 2006). We use the IPO’s size as a 
proxy for information asymmetry. We have 2 
variables that measure the IPO’s size: the IPO 
size in millions of shares and the IPO size in 
billions of Rupiah. Both variables have a strong 
correlation, which may lead to the problem of 
multicollinearity. We chose IPO size in millions 
of shares as the measure of IPO size. 
 The offer price may affect stabilization 
activities. A higher offer price may result in IPO 
overvaluation. In the Benveniste et al. (1996) 
model, underwriters stabilize as a commitment 
to prevent investors’ losses from overpriced 
IPOs. The probability of price decreases in the 
aftermarket for this IPO is higher than those with 
a low offer price. Stabilization activities in this 
situation can be expected to be more intense. 
Hence we expect a positive relationship between 
the offer price and stabilization activities. We 
have 2 measures for the offer price: the offer 
price in Rupiah and the offer price in relative 
terms. In relative terms, we use the ratio of price 
to book value (PBV). Again, we have to choose 
1 as a proxy for the offer price. We chose the 
price to book value over the offer price in 
Rupiah as our proxy for the offer price. 
Another variable that may affect stabilization 
activities is the underwriters’ reputation. 
Lewellen (2006) showed that underwriters’ repu-
tations affect price stabilization. As explained in 
the previous section, a negative return in the IPO 
aftermarket may provide negative signals about 
the underwriters to investors: incompetent, poor 
commitment, lack of effort. These negative 
signals may have an adverse impact on the 
underwriters’ business. This argument seems to 
have support from empirical evidence. For 
example, Dunbar (2000) found that larger under-
writers lost their market share by significant 
amounts as a consequence of inaccurately priced 
IPOs. We may predict that the underwriter will 
attempt to maintain his/her reputation using 
price stabilization. Price decrease in the under-
written IPO may damage their reputation, so the 
underwriters will be more active to stabilize the 
IPO’s price in the aftermarket. We expect that 
underwriters with good reputations will stabilize 
the IPO more intensely than those with a worse 
reputation. The stake is larger for those with a 
higher reputation. We expect to have a positive 
relationship between the underwriters’ reputa-
tion and stabilization activities. We use the 
amount of IPOs underwritten during the period 
of our study as a proxy for the underwriters’ 
Table 7.  Descriptive Statistics for IPO size, IPO percentage, Offer Price, and Price to Book Value, 
Underwriters Proceeds 
This table shows descriptive statistics of the IPO size, the offer price, the percentage of IPO, and the Price to 
Book Value. IPO size consists of the IPO size in millions of shares and in billions of Rupiah. IPO percentage is 
the percentage of shares offered to the public by the IPO relative to the total outstanding shares. Total 
underwriter IPO proceed is accumulated during the period of study. This variable is used as a proxy for the 
underwriters’ reputation. Price to Book Value is a ratio of offer price to book value of the company stated in its 
IPO prospectus. 
 Mean Median Standard deviation Minimum Maximum N 
IPO size (in millions of shares) 36,099,908 130 268,059,662 1 2,847,433,500 151 
IPO offer price (Rp) 750 500 823 100 4,650 150 
IPO size (billion Rp) 8,773,486 60 54,769,368 0 455,589,360 151 
Percent (%) 25.72 25 10.57 0.38 66.67 148 
Shares underwriting size  
(million shares) 
61,561,297 199,237 144,522,593 0 561,859,248 147 
Price to Book Value 2.17 1.60 1.80 -2.50 11.58 153 
Source:  Center for Business and Economic Data, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Gadjah Mada 
and Authors’ calculation 
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reputation. The larger the number of IPOs an 
underwriter underwrites, the higher the reputa-
tion of that underwriter. Specifically, we accu-
mulated the amount of IPOs for each underwriter 
during the period of our study. Then we 
calculated the average of the accumulated IPOs. 
We assign a dummy variable of 1 for the under-
writers with accumulated IPOs higher than the 
average, and zero otherwise. Underwriters with a 
dummy variable of one have a higher reputation 
than those with the zero value. 
Table 8 shows the regression results. Over-
all, regression analyses do not seem to provide 
convincing results. However, there is an indica-
tion that the Price to Book Value has a positive 
relationship with stabilization activities. In 
column (3), the regression coefficient for Price 
to Book Value shows a positive and significant 
sign. Underwriters seem to intervene more in-
tensely for the more expensive IPOs. The more 
expensive IPOs may create higher uncertainty, 
and higher information asymmetry. Thus our 
results seem to support underpricing models that 
are based on asymmetry framework (Chowdhry 
& Nanda, 1996; Benveniste et al., 1996). Our 
results are not consistent with those of Lewellen 
(2006) who found no support for underpricing 
models based on asymmetric information, but 
did find support for underwriters’ reputations. 
Lewellen (2006) founds that larger investment 
banks stabilize more than smaller ones. Further, 
Lewellen (2006) showed that retail investment 
banks stabilize even more.  
CONCLUSION 
We attempted to investigate IPO underpric-
ing in the Indonesian market, and develop meas-
ures for stabilization activities in the IPO mar-
ket. We found that IPO underpricing in the Indo-
nesian market is around 25%. The distribution of 
the IPO return is heavily positively skewed. The 
distribution becomes closer to normality as the 
periods are lengthened. Thus the distribution for 
the initial return is more positively skewed than 
that for 5, 30, and 90 day returns. We found that 
the number of days in which the closing prices 
 
Table 8. Regression Results of the Determinants of Stabilization Activities 
This table reports Ordinary Least Square regression results of the various determinants of stabilization activities. 
In column (1) and (2), we use the number of closing prices during the first 30 trading days that are equal to the 
offer price. In column (3) and (4), we use the skewness of the daily return of the IPO during the first 30 trading 
days. The Price to Book Value is calculated as the offering price divided by book value in the year of going 
public. For underwriters’ reputation, we use a dummy with the value of 1 for underwriters that have total IPO 
proceeds during our period of study higher than the mean of IPO proceed, and 0 otherwise. IPO size is the 
number of millions of shares of the IPO. The percentage is the percent of the IPO relative to total outstanding 
shares. ***,**, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 
 
22.7044*** 
(<.0001) 
24.27344*** 
(<.0001) 
0.15432 
(0.6105) 
-0.14152  
(0.4033) 
Price to Book Value -0.06836  
(0.8864) 
-0.10879 
(0.812) 
0.07459 
(0.1157) 
0.07544* 
(0.0946) 
Underwriters’ reputation -1.48504  
(0.4475) 
-1.04476  
(0.5711) 
0.02799 
(0.8799) 
-0.0194 
(0.9125) 
IPO size 
 
0.17859 
(0.4088) 
 -0.0223 
(0.3011) 
 
IPO percentage 0.02226 
(0.7879) 
 -0.00669 (0.4012)  
Adjusted R-Square 
F-value  
(prob) 
N 
0.08 
0.28 
(0.8893) 
143 
0.0029 
0.21 
(0.8108) 
145 
0.0319 
1.13 
(0.3448) 
141 
0.0198 
1.42 
(0.2442) 
143 
Source:  Center for Business and Economic Data, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Gadjah Mada 
and Authors’ calculation 
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are equal to the offer price, and the skewness of 
the first 30 day return, are the ‘best’ measures of 
stabilization activities. There is an indication that 
underwriters stabilize more the more expensive 
the IPO is.  
We believe that this study on IPO stabiliza-
tion provides a promising future. As data 
become more easily available, the study can be 
extended in several directions. For example, 
transaction data can be used to study the intraday 
price behavior during first day or first 30 trading 
days in the aftermarket, in which stabilization 
activities are conducted. Various types of under-
writers (for example retail or institutional under-
writers) may have different stabilization beha-
viors. We leave these issues for future research. 
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